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Abstract 
We study the influence of economic inequality on co-operation and aid distribution in 
community-based development schemes. For this, we organized a field experiment in 
which community members contributed to a collective effort to attract aid. We find that 
devolving aid distribution to community representatives increases the aid attracted, but 
that this benefits community representatives only. At the same time, however, 
community representatives do take fairness considerations into account. They give 
higher aid shares to poorer community members and lower shares to low contributors. 
Moreover, representatives with lower relative wealth or who contribute relatively more 
keep higher aid shares. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades governmental and non-governmental aid resources have been 
increasingly distributed through participatory or community-based development (CBD) 
schemes (Mansuri and Rao 2004). In some occasions, the benefits are equally distributed 
irrespective of people’s contribution. This is the case for the construction of local public 
goods, such as a school or a common water well, or the maintenance of local roads or 
irrigation systems. In other cases, private goods are distributed, such as seeds or tools, which 
are not necessarily distributed equally. 
 
The mandate to distribute these aid resources among the community members is often 
devolved to local community representatives. This has several advantages. In comparison 
with the officers of aid programmes, local representatives tend to have better access to local 
information which might increase the efficiency and sustainability of the programme. At the 
same time, however, participatory programmes are vulnerable to aid capture by community 
representatives (Galasso and Ravallion 2001; Conning and Kevane 2002; Platteau and 
Abraham 2002; Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Ravallion 2003; D’Exelle 2009; Takasaki 2011). 
Such capture is commonly modelled as the autonomous decision of community 
representatives, who act as brokers between their community and the outside aid community. 
The underlying models, however, ignore the following two important elements. 
 
First, a community-based development approach requires community members to get 
mobilized and organized, on which aid provision is made conditional. Setting up new 
community-based development projects therefore requires sufficient contributions from 
community members, in terms of time and labour. If aid resources are equally distributed 
irrespective of people’s contribution, such ‘community mobilization’ can be modelled as a 
public good and free riding behaviour is to be expected. Giving local community 
representatives a mandate to distribute aid resources among the community members 
internalizes the externalities inherent in community mobilization. The distributive 
implications of doing so are not clear though. On the one hand, the devolution of aid 
distribution may reduce free riding behaviour and hence lead to higher amounts of aid 
attracted. On the other hand, community representatives may capture a substantial proportion 
of the attracted aid resources. 
 
Second, little attention has been paid to the importance of fairness. There is growing evidence 
in behavioural economics that fairness concerns matter when scarce resources are distributed. 
Economic inequality may exert an important influence on the dynamics of community 
mobilization and aid distribution for communities that value fairness. Moreover, as 
community representatives are most active in community mobilization, it may well be fair 
that they get a larger part of the provided aid resources. Consequently, an unequal distribution 
of aid resources is not necessarily ‘unfair’ if there is economic inequality or if contributions 
to community mobilization have been unequal as well. 
 
In this study, we look at the impact of devolving aid distribution to endogenously selected 
community representatives on community mobilization and aid distribution as well as the 
importance of economic inequality on these effects. For this, we design an experiment that 
simulates the distribution of development aid channelled through a participatory development 
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approach. Such an approach implies that sufficient community mobilization is required. In 
particular, the final beneficiaries are expected to contribute sufficient amounts of resources, 
including time and labour. The amount of aid attracted depends on the level of community 
mobilization, simulated by the collective contribution (the details of our experimental design 
are provided in Section 2). The community members with the highest contribution to 
community mobilization are selected as community representatives. 
 
Two treatments are organized that differ in the way the attracted aid is distributed among the 
community members. In the first treatment, the aid resources are distributed equally 
irrespective of individual contributions. In the second treatment, the community member with 
the highest contribution distributes the aid resources. Comparing both treatments allows us to 
study the influence of devolving the distribution of aid resources to the community level. To 
study the effects of inequality, we ran two between-subject treatments. In one treatment, all 
group members receive equal endowments, while in the second half of the group members 
receive a high endowment and the other half a low endowment. 
 
An important reason for organizing experiments in a field laboratory is to analyse how 
community mobilization and aid distribution is influenced by devolving aid distribution to 
self selected community representatives, and that we can do it in a controlled way. A 
controlled environment is also very helpful to investigate the effect of economic inequality. 
In real-life, it is virtually impossible to observe how people behave under different 
institutional and economic conditions in otherwise identical situations. 
 
The results of our analyses can be summarized as follows. We find that devolving the 
responsibility of aid distribution to community representatives increases the level of 
community mobilization. While this leads to larger amounts of aid attracted, it does not 
translate into larger absolute aid shares for the community members (except for the 
community representatives). Community representatives, however, do not capture all 
resources, but take fairness considerations into account when distributing aid. They give 
higher aid shares to poorer community members and lower shares to community members 
who contribute little. Moreover, representatives with lower relative wealth or who contribute 
relatively more keep higher aid shares. Finally, we find that endowment inequality leads to 
higher levels of mobilization when aid resources are equally distributed but not when aid 
distribution is devolved to the community. 
2 Experimental design 
To simulate the distribution of development aid through a participatory development scheme, 
we designed an experiment, the structure of which closely simulates the actual experiences of 
our subjects. We organized the field experiment in November-December 2009, in six rural 
villages in the Pacific and interior regions of Nicaragua, where in recent years substantial 
amounts of aid resources have been distributed through participatory development projects. 
2.1 A field experiment with community mobilization as public good 
Potential aid donors that follow a participatory approach expect the community to identify 
needs, elaborate plans and budget, get organized, etc. As these are important aid conditions, 
 3
aid donors will be more willing to provide aid resources in communities that manage to 
mobilize successfully. Such mobilization requires that community members pool sufficient 
amounts of resources, often in the form of time and labour. 
 
In the experimental game we model this in the following way. Groups of n = 8 subjects 
interact for t = 10 rounds. In each round, all group members are asked to simultaneously and 
privately decide on their contribution gi from their endowment yi to a public account. The 
amount of aid attracted is calculated as the total contribution to the public account, multiplied 
by an efficiency factor b, with nb <<1 . After this, a second stage is added where the 
attracted aid is distributed among the group members, each receiving a share ݏ௜௧ so that the 
payoff of individual i in round t is equal to: ߨ௜௧ = ݕ௜ − ݃௜௧ + ݏ௜௧ ∙ ܾ ∑ ݃௝௧௡௝ୀଵ . 
 
We organize two different treatments that vary in the distribution mechanism. In a first 
treatment, called the ‘equal sharing’ treatment, ݏ௜௧ = 1 ݊⁄ , in which everyone receives the 
same share of the attracted aid. This treatment is played for five consecutive rounds. After 
this treatment, the same players continue for another five rounds, in which the highest 
contributor distributes the attracted aid among the group members (called the ‘representative 
sharing’ treatment).1 In particular, he/she decides on the vector ሾݏଵ௧, ݏଶ௧, … , ݏ௡௧ሿ, with 
∑ ݏ௜௧ = 1௡௜ୀଵ  and 0≥its .2 Comparing both treatments allows us to investigate how devolving 
aid distribution to local community representatives effects aid distribution and community 
mobilization. 
 
To study the effect of endowment inequality on community mobilization and aid distribution, 
and its interaction with the effect of the devolution of aid distribution, we organize an 
additional between-subject treatment comparison. In one treatment, all group members 
receive equal endowments y = 10 units, while in the second treatment, half of the group 
members receive a high endowment of y = 12 and the other half a low endowment of y = 8. 
Combining all treatments leads to the design depicted in Table 1. The table also shows the 
number of sessions in each treatment. 
 
In each community we organized a maximum of three sessions in a maximum of two days. 
Participants were randomly selected from a village census. In total, 128 persons participated 
in 16 sessions. Seventy-two of them are female (56.25 per cent). None had participated in a 
similar experiment before. Each session lasted between 90 and 120 minutes. Average 
earnings were C$117.7 (i.e. equal to US$5.67, being more than two days average income), 
with the highest earnings being C$200.0 and the lowest C$70.0. After the experiment, 
participants were asked to answer a series of post-experimental questions which allowed us to 
capture important socio-economic characteristics (including economic inequality). Some 
descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 1 (Table A1), while detailed experimental 
procedures and the instructions are presented in Appendix 2. 
                                                
1 People do not know how many rounds will be played or that a second series with different rules will follow 
the first treatment. 
2 To facilitate the decision‒making by community representatives, we asked them to decide first on the amount 
of aid to keep for themselves, and second on the distribution of the remaining resources among the other group 
members. For each group member they were asked to decide whether to give nothing, a low share, or a high 
share; with high shares being double as high as low shares. S௜ = 0,1,2 with 0 = nothing, 1 = low and 2 = high. 
ݏ௜ = ௜ܵ 	. ሺଵି௦ೝሻ∑ ୗ೔೔ಯ౨  and sr is the share kept by the representative. 
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2.2 Theoretical considerations 
In this section, we elaborate theoretical predictions for individual behaviour in terms of 
contributions to the public account and aid distribution, and how this may differ across the 
treatments. We start with the equal sharing treatment and the representative sharing 
treatment, after which we continue with a reflection on the possible effect of economic 
inequality, both induced by experimental treatments and by real-life heterogeneity. 
Equal sharing treatment 
Note that the equal sharing treatment, where all group members receive an equal aid share, is 
similar to the standard public goods game (Ledyard, 1995). From b > 1 follows that it is 
socially optimal to contribute everything as this maximizes the group payoff. However, as b/n 
< 1 and with people having selfish preferences, each player has a dominant strategy to free 
ride for any given allocation of the other group members, leading to a Nash equilibrium 
where everyone contributes nothing at all. As confirmed by several experimental studies, 
however, the assumption of selfish preferences is commonly rejected. In reality, many people 
are conditional co-operators, that is, they co-operate if they expect others to do the same. 
Consequently, contribution levels will commonly be higher than predicted by the Nash 
equilibrium of zero co-operation. With repeated play, however, co-operation levels tend to 
deteriorate over time as conditional co-operators reduce their contribution when they realize 
other group members free ride (on this, see e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001). 
Representative sharing treatment 
In the representative sharing treatment, there are two mechanisms that stimulate individual 
contributions which are absent in the equal sharing treatment. First, with standard preferences 
a player who expects to be the only highest contributor will opt for full contribution and keep 
all resources. He does so since the attracted aid resources will always be strictly larger than 
his individual contribution (as b > 1 and si = 1). The other members, knowing that the highest 
contributor will keep all aid, do not have any incentive to increase their contribution. As a 
consequence, the strategy combination where one group member contributes everything and 
others do not contribute anything at all, will be an equilibrium. A strategy combination where 
all group members contribute the same amount can never be an equilibrium. The individual 
(expected) pay-off is then equal to: ߨ௜ = ݕ − ݃௜ + ݌௥௘௣௥	ܾ ∑ ݃௝௡௝ୀଵ . With the probability to 
become the representative ݌௥௘௣௥ = 1/݊, we have the same situation as the standard public 
goods game, and with b < n, it is not an optimal strategy to contribute anything to the public 
good. The crucial difference with the equal sharing treatment, however, is that ݌௥௘௣௥ is not 
fixed, but depends on the number of highest contributors. As a consequence, we have 
multiple equilibria. If the efficiency factor b > 2, a strategy combination where two risk-
neutral group members contribute everything and all others nothing, may also be an 
equilibrium. Such competition among highest contributors will certainly stimulate 
contributions to the public good. 
 
Second, with social preferences, people will be more inclined to contribute—as we predicted 
in the equal sharing treatment. Moreover, social preferences may stimulate community 
representatives to punish non co-operative group members by giving them lower aid shares. 
As shown by experimental studies (for example, Fehr and Gächter 2000), introducing a 
punishment option leads to higher contribution levels. Therefore, if group members anticipate 
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that the representative gives less to less generous contributors, they may be willing to 
contribute more. 
 
In sum, compared to the equal sharing treatment in the representative sharing treatment there 
are two additional mechanisms (through competition for the representative’s role and 
anticipation of punishment by the representative) that stimulate individual contributions. 
Hence, we expect co-operation to be higher with representative sharing. 
The influence of economic inequality 
There is a large literature on the effect of economic inequality in standard public goods 
games (remember that with equal sharing our game is actually a public goods game), but the 
evidence is inconclusive (for example, see the literature review in Anderson, Mellor, and 
Milyo 2008). Relying on models of inequality aversion and altruism, Buckley and Croson 
(2006) predicted low and high endowment subjects to contribute differently in absolute 
terms, but this was not confirmed by their experimental results. However, other studies found 
a negative effect of inequality on contributions to public goods. Cardenas (2003), for 
example, found that real-life inequality reduces contributions in a public goods game, but 
only when participants were allowed to communicate with each other. 
 
In the representative sharing treatment, introducing endowment inequality does not change 
the existence of the equilibrium where one group member is the highest contributor and keeps 
all aid resources while all other group members do not contribute anything. With unequal 
endowment, however, players with higher endowments are more capable of overbidding the 
players with lower endowment. As a consequence, high endowment players have the highest 
chance of becoming the highest contributor. 
 
Besides the experimentally induced inequality through differences in endowments, real-life 
inequality may be brought into the experiment. As the participants knew the other group 
members in the experiment, they were able to compare their individual wealth with the 
average group wealth. It is assumed that participants bring this variation spontaneously into 
the game, which is a realistic assumption for participants from populations where 
heterogeneity is substantial, and who frequently interact with each other in their daily life 
(Cardenas and Ostrom 2004). 
 
Both sources of inequality may have a different effect on individual behaviour. Whereas 
endowment inequality leads to variation in the technical upper bound of contributions, real-
life economic inequality does not have an influence on the range of feasible options in the 
experiment. It is not clear what the overall effect of real-life inequality will be on individual 
behaviour in the representative sharing treatment, as there may be two opposing effects. First, 
because of social preferences poorer (richer) people may expect richer (poorer) people to 
contribute more (less). Second, socio-economic heterogeneity may also translate into 
differences in risk aversion as suggested by some experimental studies (Miyata 2003; Wik, 
Kebede, Bergland, and Holden 2004). Richer people tend to be less risk averse and may 
therefore be more inclined to compete for the representative’s role. 
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3 Analyses 
In this section, we present the empirical results. We start with an analysis of descriptive 
statistics that look at treatment effects and time trends. Thereafter, we report the results of 
regression analyses that investigate how individual contributions to community mobilization 
and aid distribution are influenced by economic inequality, both induced by the experiment 
and from real life. 
3.1 Co-operation 
Table 2 shows the average contribution in each round, separately for the equal and unequal 
endowment treatments. As explained before, in the first five rounds the attracted aid is 
distributed equally (equal sharing treatment) whereas in the last five rounds a representative 
distributes the resources (representative sharing treatment). We observe that in the equal 
sharing treatment average contributions decline over time. This is consistent with existing 
evidence from experimental public good games (Fischbacher et al. 2001). After a while 
people start to realise that others free ride, and as a reciprocal reaction reduce their 
contributions. In the representative sharing treatment, in contrast, average contributions 
slightly increase over time. The same patterns are observed in the equal and unequal 
endowment treatments. As explained before, this is the result of (anticipation of) punishment 
by the representative and/or competition among group members to become the representative. 
 
To analyse whether these observations are statistically meaningful, we take the average 
contribution in each group across all rounds as the independent unit of observation. 
Calculating Spearman correlation coefficients between the average contribution per session 
and the round number, we find that the average contribution decreases in the equal sharing 
treatment (first five rounds) both with endowment equality (Spearman’s rho -0.619, two sided 
p = .000; N = 40) and endowment inequality (Spearman’s rho  
-0.651, two sided p = .000; N = 40). In the representative sharing treatment, average 
contributions increase over time with endowment equality (Spearman’s rho 0.453, two sided 
p = .003; N = 40) and endowment inequality (Spearman’s rho 0.319, two sided p = .045; N = 
40). 
 
Comparing the average contributions between the first five rounds and the last five rounds, it 
appears that contributions are higher in the representative sharing treatment than in the equal 
sharing treatment. Applying a Wilcoxon signed ranks test to the average contributions of each 
group, we find that the distribution of group averages is statistically different between the 
equal sharing and representative sharing treatments, both in the equal endowment treatment 
(two sided p = 0.012; N = 16) and the unequal endowment treatment (two sided p = 0.017; N 
= 16). 
 
Furthermore, we observe that in the equal sharing treatment contributions are lower in the 
equal endowment treatment than in the unequal endowment treatment, but that such 
difference is absent in the representative sharing treatment. Applying a Mann‒Whitney test to 
compare the average contributions of each group between the equal and unequal endowment 
treatments, we find that this difference is statistically significant in the equal sharing 
treatment (two-sided p = 0.016; N = 16), but not in the representative sharing treatment (two-
sided p = 1.000; N = 16). 
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To analyse this further, we calculate averages separately for low and high endowment 
players. Figure 1 pools both treatments and shows the average contribution separately for 
equal, high, and low endowment players. We observe that both high and low endowment 
players contribute more than equal endowment players. The first is in line with existing 
fairness theories, according to which people are inequality averse and therefore distribute 
resources in such a way that inequality is reduced. However, the same theories would also 
predict that low endowment players would contribute less, which is contradicted by our data. 
Buckley and Croson (2006) came to a similar finding. They attribute this to people’s belief 
that free riding is morally wrong as suggested by Sugden (1984), and hence, both poor and 
rich players need to contribute their fair share. As a consequence, low endowment players 
contribute an equally large absolute share as high endowment players. This explains why 
average contributions are higher in the unequal endowment treatment. 
 
This difference between low and high endowment players disappears in the representative 
sharing treatment. We observe that the increase in contributions between rounds five and six 
is larger for high endowment members than for low endowment members. Whereas in the 
equal sharing treatment high and low endowment players contribute equally, in the 
representative sharing treatment high endowment players contribute more than low 
endowment players. This gives high endowment players a higher chance to become the 
representative. In 32 of the 40 observations of the representative sharing treatment with 
unequal endowments the representative was a high endowment player. 
3.2 Aid distribution 
On the basis of these observations, one may conclude that to maximize community 
mobilization, and hence the amount of aid attracted to the community, aid distribution by 
community representatives is better than equal distribution. However, it is also necessary to 
assess the distributive implications of devolving aid distribution to community members. It 
may be the case that community representatives keep large part of the aid for themselves, 
making community members actually worse off than with equal aid distribution. 
 
To assess this, we look at the average aid received by the group members. Figure 2a plots the 
average aid resources group members receive in the equal sharing and representative sharing 
treatments. We observe that in the equal sharing treatment, average received aid shows a 
similar pattern as the average contributions (Table 2), i.e. declining over time and higher with 
endowment inequality. This is of course not surprising given the perfect relation between 
total contributions and available aid, and the fact, that aid is equally distributed in this 
treatment. In the representative sharing treatment, average aid received (excluding the aid 
kept by the representative) does not increase above the levels of the last round of the equal 
sharing treatment. This is a striking result as in the representative sharing treatment 
substantially more aid is attracted. As demonstrated in Figure 2b, which plots the relative aid 
shares distributed among the group members (except for the community representative), we 
find that in the representative sharing treatment more than 40 per cent of the aid resources is 
kept by representatives. This suggests serious aid capture by representatives. 
 
However, two observations are required. First, as can be observed in Table A2 in the 
Appendix 1, there is substantial variation in the average share kept by the representative. 
Second, representatives may keep larger shares than other group members to compensate for 
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their higher contributions. To come to a more nuanced picture, we should look at the share of 
aid the representative keeps relative to his/her contribution to community mobilization. 
Figure 3 plots the proportion of the relative aid share kept over the relative contribution. A 
value 1 means that the representative keeps a proportion of aid relative to his/her contribution 
similar to the other group members. In addition to the mean value, the figure shows the 
minimum and maximum values across groups, for equal and unequal endowments separately. 
We observe that the value of this indicator is on average around 2, which indicates that 
community representatives keep more aid than they deserve given their contribution and 
confirms there is substantial aid capture by representatives. 
3.3 Competition among highest contributors 
As indicated by the large shares kept by the representatives, being a representative can be 
very profitable. The other group members do not have any way to punish the representative 
directly. They could reduce their contribution, but this would also affect other group 
members. The best way to react against capture by representatives is to contribute as much as 
(or more than) the representative in an attempt to seize the representative role. In this section, 
we analyze competition among largest contributors. 
 
Figure 4 plots the number of group members who make the largest contribution in a 
particular group and round, for equal and unequal endowment treatments separately. We 
observe that while both treatments start with a similar average number of largest contributors, 
in the equal endowment treatment competition increases, whereas in the inequality treatment 
it slightly declines (after an incidental increase in round three). This difference between both 
treatments is not surprising, as with inequality the pool of potential competitors is half as 
large as in the equal endowment treatment. Low endowment group members have a lower 
chance of becoming the largest contributor. As shown in Table 3, which shows the 
distribution of the largest contributions per group and round, the highest contributions are 
higher in the unequal endowment treatment compared to the equal endowment treatment. 
According to a Mann‒Whitney test, this difference is statistically significant (z = 2.831, two-
sided p = 0.005). The stronger competition for the representative role in the equality 
treatment is also reflected in that in 55 per cent of observations the highest contribution 
equalled the total endowment in the equality treatment compared to 12.5 per cent of 
observations in the inequality treatment. 
 
The fact that representatives keep large aid shares would not be a problem if there is 
sufficient rotation among group members to assume the representative role. To study change 
in the representative role, we create a variable that counts for each group the number of 
rounds (out of a maximum of four) in which the current representative is different from the 
one in the previous round (Indicator 1). An alternative way is to count the number of rounds 
(out of a maximum of five) in which the representative is a group member who has not had 
this role before (Indicator 2). Table 4 shows the distribution of both indicators, separately for 
the equal and unequal endowment treatments. We observe that the change of community 
representatives is considerable. Using a Mann‒Whitney test, we find that the distributions of 
Indicator 1 (two-sided p = 0.825) and Indicator 2 (two-sided p = 0.578) are not statistically 
different between both treatments. 
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3.4 The influence of real-life economic inequality 
So far, we have only looked at the influence of inequality induced by experimental 
treatments. However, as the participants knew the other group members in the experiment, 
they were able to compare their individual wealth with the average group wealth. As a 
consequence, participants may bring real-life inequality into the experiment. To analyse the 
influence of real-life economic inequality on the participants’ behaviour, we make use of 
regression techniques. 
 
In the first analysis, we investigate what determines one’s contribution. We estimate different 
models. In the first model we use the positive and negative standardized deviations from the 
group average of livestock as explanatory variables and only use the data of the equal 
endowment treatment (Model 1). Livestock is one of the major determinants of wealth in the 
region. The positive deviation is calculated as the absolute value of the standardized 
difference between the participant’s livestock and the group average if it is positive, 
otherwise zero.3 The negative deviation is equal to the absolute value of this difference if it is 
negative, otherwise zero. In Model 2, we only use the data of the unequal endowment 
treatment and add a control for the endowment of the group member, using a dummy variable 
equal to 1 in case the group member receives a high endowment. In Model 3, we extend 
Model 2 by adding interaction terms between the group members’ endowment and the 
positive and negative deviations of the number of cows they have. 
 
Table 5 shows the results for the equal sharing treatment. The results in all models confirm a 
negative time trend, which was previously observed in the descriptive analysis. Looking at 
the individual models, we find that in contrast to the equality treatment (Model 1) where no 
effects of real-life inequality were observed, in the inequality treatment (Model 2) poorer 
group members tend to contribute more. When adding interaction effects with the endowment 
dummy variable (Model 3), we find that this effect is mainly driven by poorer group 
members who are high endowment players in the experiment. Apparently, participants who 
are comparatively poorer than the other participants in real-life find they should contribute 
more than others if they are more able to do so (i.e. when they receive higher endowments). 
 
We now investigate individual contributions in the representative sharing treatment. We 
estimate the same models as we did for the equal sharing treatment. Table 6 shows the 
results. Here again we do not find any effect of real-life inequality in the equal endowment 
treatment (Model 1). In the unequal endowment treatment, we again find a positive effect of 
being at the same time poorer than the group average and being a high endowment player 
(Model 3). This effect, however, is much stronger than in the equal sharing treatment. This 
suggests that especially the poorer participants want to benefit from the opportunity provided 
to become the group representative (and to benefit from large aid shares). 
 
Being among the highest contributors in the representative sharing treatment gives one the 
chance to be the representative, and hence distribute the attracted aid resources; it is 
interesting to identify the determinants of being the highest contributor. Table 7 shows the 
results of a series of probit regression models that estimate the likelihood that one makes the 
largest contribution, controlling for the same variables as in the previous regressions. 
Whereas in the equality treatment (Model 1) none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant, with endowment inequality the coefficients of cows above and below the group 
                                                
3 To make sessions comparable we standardize these variables by dividing by the group average. 
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average as well as the interaction with the endowment dummy (Model 3), are all statistically 
significant. To interpret the size of these effects in probability terms we calculate predicted 
probabilities for different values of cattle property (we use values 0 and 1 above/below group 
average) and 95 per cent confidence intervals. We find that high endowment group members 
have a significantly higher likelihood of being the largest contributor if they have less 
livestock than the group average (30.93 per cent; 95 per cent confidence interval: 15.37 per 
cent, 46.50 per cent) than when they have more livestock than the group average (5.01 per 
cent; 95 per cent confidence interval: -3.56 per cent, 13.59 per cent), or equal livestock as the 
group average (2.52 per cent; 95 per cent confidence interval: -3.30 per cent, 8.34 per cent). 
This again suggests that real-life inequality induces poorer community members to make use 
of the opportunity provided by the high endowment they receive in the experiment. 
 
After having studied what influences individual contributions, we look at the distribution of 
aid. Two aspects are important: how much the representative keeps and how the remaining 
resources are distributed among the rest of the group. We start with the latter. Remember that 
a representative has three options: giving a high share, a low share, or nothing to each of the 
other group members. As the latter option was selected in only very few cases, we limit the 
analysis to the choice of a high share compared to either a low or no share. In particular, we 
estimate the likelihood that a particular group member receives a high share. For this, we 
estimate a probit regression controlling for the positive and negative deviation from the 
average contribution. The positive (negative) deviation is calculated as the absolute value of 
the standardized difference between the participant’s contribution and the group average if it 
is positive (negative), otherwise zero. Table 8 reports the results. 
 
According to the results of Model 1, which uses the data of the equal endowment treatment 
only, the aid share that group members receive from the representative is lower when they 
contribute less than the group average. Calculating marginal probabilities we find that the 
likelihood of receiving a high share decreases with 12.93 per cent for each unit below the 
average contribution. In Model 2, which uses the data of the unequal endowment treatment 
only, we use the same explanatory variables as in Model 1, and add a control for the 
endowment of the group member. Converting the results into probability terms, we find that 
the likelihood that a group member receives a high share decreases with 18.45 per cent for 
each unit below the average contribution, and, ceteris paribus, is 14.45 per cent lower for 
high endowment group members. To test whether the marginal effect of one’s relative 
contribution differs between high and low endowment players, in Model 3 we also add 
interaction effects between the group member’s endowment and his/her relative contribution. 
The interaction effects are not statistically significant. 
 
In the final analysis, we investigate the aid representatives keep for themselves. For this we 
estimate a regression on the pooled treatments with the proportion of aid kept by a 
representative in a specific round as dependent variable. We control for the endowment of the 
representative, the representative’s livestock, and his/her share in the total contribution made 
by the group (Model 1). In a second model (Model 2), we also control for the representative’s 
livestock and the interaction with his/her endowment. Table 9 shows the results. In Model 1, 
without the interaction effects, we observe that the representatives’ contribution correlates 
positively with the share of aid resources they keep. In Model 2, where we add interaction 
effects between real-life inequality and endowment inequality, we find that representatives 
who are less wealthy than the group average (as measured by livestock) tend to keep a higher 
proportion of aid for themselves in the unequal endowment treatment, but not in the equal 
endowment treatment (where the interaction effect nullifies this effect). Representatives also 
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keep larger shares if they are wealthier than the group average and they have a low 
endowment in the experiment, but this effect is reduced when they have a high endowment or 
endowments are equal among all players. 
4 Conclusion 
In this article, we study the effect of economic inequality on co-operation and aid distribution 
in community-based development schemes in rural Nicaragua. For this, we use a field 
experiment in which individual community members contribute resources to a collective 
effort to attract external aid, and investigated the influence of economic inequality, both 
induced by experimental treatments and resulting from real-life heterogeneity outside the lab. 
We find that community mobilization is higher when aid distribution is devolved to 
community representatives. This increases the amount of aid attracted, but as community 
representatives keep high aid shares, this does not lead to more aid for the other community 
members. In addition, endowment inequality leads to higher levels of mobilization when aid 
resources are equally distributed but not when aid distribution is devolved to community 
representatives. Finally, although community representatives keep high aid shares, they do 
take fairness considerations into account. They give higher aid shares to poorer community 
members and lower shares to community members who contribute relatively little. Moreover, 
representatives with lower wealth relative to the group average, tend to keep more aid for 
themselves. They also do so when they contribute more relative to the group average. The 
latter two elements, however, cannot fully justify the very high shares community 
representatives keep for themselves.  
 
To assess fully the distributional implications of such community-based scheme, we also 
need to look at the change in community representatives over the different rounds. We find 
that in consecutive rounds the representative role tends to be assumed by different 
community members. This indicates that the high aid shares representatives keep has less 
serious consequences for the final distribution of economic resources. If the representative 
role were always assumed by the same person, high aid capture would be a much more 
serious issue. 
 
In reality, however, it is more common that community members do not have equal 
opportunities to become the community representative. In our experiment we find that 
community members with high endowment can contribute more and hence have better 
chances of becoming the representative. There may be more variables on which community 
members differ and that correlate with people’s capacity to act as a community 
representative. One such variable is the experience community representatives acquire at the 
interface between aid donors and communities. As documented by Bierschenk, Chauveau, 
and Olivier De Sardan (2000), the capacity to work at the interface and to make contact with 
aid providers is mainly acquired through experience at the interface. As a consequence, the 
chance of becoming the community representative not only depends on one’s decision in the 
current round, but also on one’s previous experience as a community representative. When 
this is the case, changes in community representatives will become less frequent over time. 
 
In addition to texperience, the following three factors, which have not been dealt with in our 
research, may also have an influence on community mobilization and aid sharing. First, we 
assumed that aid donors did not exert any influence on the selection of community 
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representatives. While in reality community representatives are indeed endogenously 
selected, there may be some room for aid donors to interfere and eventually influence who 
gets the role of local aid distributor. As argued by D’Exelle (2009), this is necessary if aid 
donors are really committed to discouraging recurrent exclusion processes and aid capture by 
community representatives. Second, in our experimental design the information on the aid 
distribution is always made public. However, in reality community representatives oftentimes 
manage to conceal information on (part of) the distribution. That this may influence 
individual behaviour has been demonstrated by D’Exelle and Riedl (2008) who found an 
important effect of information on aid distribution. Third, as indicated by previous 
experimental work (see, for example, Cappelen, Sorensen, and Tungodden 2010), variation in 
the causes of wealth/needs of individual community members as well as the sources of the 
economic resources that are distributed, may be of important relevance when aid resources 
are distributed. Undoubtedly, a further investigation of the determinants of aid mobilization 
and aid distribution, taking due consideration of these factors, would certainly be a valuable 
extension to our research. 
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Table 1: Treatments 
 
Equal sharing 
(5 rounds) 
Representative 
sharing 
(5 rounds) 
Equal 
endowments 
8 sessions x 8 participants = 64 participants 
Unequal 
endowments 
8 sessions x 8 participants = 64 participants 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
 
Table 2: Average contribution per round and per treatment 
Round 
Equal 
endowments 
Unequal endowments 
Equal sharing 
1 5.33 (2.70) 6.20 (2.80) 
2 4.13 (2.36) 5.61 (2.63) 
3 3.53 (2.24) 4.55 (2.15) 
4 3.33 (2.21) 4.38 (2.24) 
5 2.89 (2.04) 4.22 (2.54) 
Total 3.84 (2.46) 4.99 (2.59) 
Representative sharing 
6 5.09 (2.74) 5.75 (2.44) 
7 5.23 (2.83) 5.61 (2.53) 
8 5.95 (2.69) 5.48 (2.80) 
9 6.11 (2.99) 5.72 (2.90) 
10 6.36 (2.90) 6.56 (3.07) 
Total 5.75 (2.86) 5.83 (2.77) 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
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Figure 1: Contributions of high, low and equal endowment groups. 
(a) Average contributions (b) Share of endowment contributed 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
 
Figure 2: Average share per group member with endowment equality and inequality 
(a) Average aid shares (absolute levels) (b) Average aid shares (relative levels) 
Note. Absolute aid share = amount of aid received. Relative aid share = aid received/(total aid/n), with n = 8; the 
share of the representative is not included in the representative sharing treatment. 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
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Figure 3: (aid representative/total aid)/(contribution representative/total contribution) 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
 
Figure 4: Number of largest contributors with endowment equality and inequality 
 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
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Table 3: Distribution of highest contribution 
Equality % Inequality % 
6 5.00 
7 5.00 2.50 
8 15.00 25.00 
9 20.00 15.00 
10 55.00 32.50 
11 12.50 
12 12.50 
Tot 100.00 100.00 
N 40 40 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
 
Table 4: Change in community representatives 
Indicator 1  
Representative round t ≠ 
representative round t-1 
 Indicator 2 
First time group representative 
 Equality Inequality   Equality Inequality 
1 round 0 1  1 round 2 1 
2 rounds 3 3  2 rounds 1 5 
3 rounds 3 1  3 rounds 5 1 
4 rounds 2 3  4 rounds 0 1 
N 8 8   8 8 
Source: Data from own experiments. 
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Table 5: Determinants of individual contribution (equal sharing treatment) 
 
Model 1 
(Equal) 
Model 2 
(Unequal) 
Model 3 
(Unequal) 
Cows above group average 
-0.116 0.168 -0.292 
(0.153) (0.135) (0.333) 
Cows below group average 
-0.0873 1.643** -0.622 
(0.464) (0.661) (1.017) 
High endowment (dummy) 
0.514 -2.512 
(0.412) (1.360) 
High endowment (dummy) x cows above group 
average 
0.600 
(0.503) 
High endowment (dummy) x cows below group 
average 
3.541** 
(1.340) 
Round 2 
-1.203*** -0.594 -0.594 
(0.202) (0.319) (0.320) 
Round 3 
-1.797*** -1.656*** -1.656*** 
(0.394) (0.321) (0.322) 
Round 4 
-2.000*** -1.828*** -1.828*** 
(0.326) (0.423) (0.425) 
Round 5 
-2.438*** -1.984*** -1.984*** 
(0.456) (0.441) (0.442) 
Constant 
4.550*** 4.223*** 6.406*** 
(0.967) (0.722) (1.093) 
Observations 320 320 320 
R-squared 0.219 0.171 0.204 
Note: OLS regression; village fixed effects; Robust standard errors to correct for intra-group dependencies in 
parentheses; two-sided significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Computatoins with data from own experiments. 
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Table 6: Determinants of individual contribution (representative sharing treatment) 
 
Model 1 
(Equal) 
Model 2 
(Unequal) 
Model 3 
(Unequal) 
Cows above group average 
-0.018 0.401* -0.437 
(0.163) (0.187) (0.351) 
Cows below group average 
-0.264 1.844 -1.784 
(0.739) (1.019) (1.204) 
High endowment (dummy) 
1.082 -3.707 
(0.769) (2.390) 
High endowment (dummy) x cows above group 
average  
1.129* 
(0.587) 
High endowment (dummy) x cows below group 
average 
5.487** 
(2.256) 
Round 2 
0.066 -0.365** -0.342** 
(0.433) (0.144) (0.135) 
Round 3 
0.760 -0.490 -0.459 
(0.582) (0.373) (0.389) 
Round 4 
0.654 -0.433 -0.319 
(0.552) (0.261) (0.232) 
Round 5 
0.989 0.585 0.621 
(0.555) (0.431) (0.431) 
Constant 
5.291*** 3.101** 6.738*** 
(0.584) (1.107) (1.485) 
Observations 288 288 288 
R-squared 0.074 0.115 0.182 
Note: Previous representative excluded; OLS regression; village fixed effects; Robust standard errors to correct 
for intra-group dependencies in parentheses; two-sided significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Computations with data from own experiments. 
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Table 7: Determinants of being highest contributor (representative sharing treatment) 
 
Model 1 
(Equal) 
Model 2 
(Unequal) 
Model 3 
(Unequal) 
Cows above group average 
0.049 0.180** -0.255 
(0.063) (0.084) (0.160) 
Cows below group average 
0.096 0.734*** -0.676** 
(0.208) (0.271) (0.339) 
High endowment (dummy) 
0.651 -1.344* 
(0.498) (0.717) 
High endowment (dummy) x cows above group 
average 
0.568*** 
(0.194) 
High endowment (dummy) x cows below group 
average 
2.135*** 
(0.618) 
Round 2 
-0.001 -0.118 -0.117 
(0.120) (0.167) (0.169) 
Round 3 
0.160 0.224 0.208 
(0.145) (0.280) (0.290) 
Round 4 
0.305 -0.061 -0.079 
(0.231) (0.177) (0.179) 
Round 5 
0.300 -0.206 -0.210 
(0.231) (0.142) (0.151) 
Constant 
-0.801*** -2.112*** -0.679** 
(0.284) (0.465) (0.323) 
Observations 320 320 320 
Pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.099 0.126 
Note: Probit regression; village fixed effects; Robust standard errors to correct for intra-group dependencies in 
parentheses; two-sided significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Computations with data from own experiments. 
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Table 8: Aid distribution (representative sharing treatment) 
 
Model 1 
(Equal) 
Model 2 
(Unequal) 
Model 3 
(Unequal) 
Contribution above group average 
-0.026 -0.105 0.070 
(0.043) (0.067) (0.176) 
Contribution below group average 
-0.351*** -0.532** -0.827*** 
(0.113) (0.257) (0.222) 
High endowment (dummy) 
-0.419** -0.648 
(0.174) (0.395) 
High endowment (dummy) * contribution above 
group average 
-0.185 
(0.198) 
High endowment (dummy) * contribution below 
group average 
0.537 
(0.339) 
Constant 
-0.311 0.099 0.223 
(0.297) (0.303) (0.215) 
Observations 320 320 320 
Pseudo R squared 0.131 0.190 0.230 
Note: Probit regression; village and round fixed effects; Robust standard errors to correct for intra-group 
dependencies in parentheses; two-sided significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Computations with data from own experiments. 
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Table 9: Proportion of aid kept by representative 
 
Model 1 
(Pooled) 
Model 2 
(Pooled) 
Treatment: 1= equality 0 = inequality 
0.007 0.475 
(0.133) (0.299) 
High endowment (dummy) 
-0.029 0.224 
(0.156) (0.395) 
Share of total contribution 
1.780* 1.673 
(0.972) (1.009) 
Cows above group average 
0.010 0.320* 
(0.022) (0.154) 
Cows below group average 
0.163 0.577* 
(0.116) (0.273) 
Equal treatment (dummy) * cows above group average 
 -0.336** 
 (0.140) 
Equal treatment (dummy) * cows below group average 
 -0.468* 
 (0.257) 
High endowment (dummy) * cows above group average 
 -0.279* 
 (0.155) 
High endowment (dummy) * cows below group average 
 -0.261 
 (0.298) 
Constant 
-0.151 -0.542* 
(0.190) (0.299) 
Observations 80 80 
R-squared 0.1834 0.2062 
Note: Tobit regression; village and round fixed effects; Robust standard errors to correct for intra-group 
dependencies in parentheses; two-sided significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Computations with data from own experiments. 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics 
Table A1. Characteristics of the participants 
Cows above group average 1.41 (6.15) 
Cows below group average 0.65 (0.46) 
Number friendship links 4.26 (2.99) 
Number of family (in-law) links 0.30 (0.96) 
Number of family links 0.50 (0.76) 
Number of links through social public activities 2.01 (2.48) 
Number of economic links 0.55 (1.43) 
Source: Computations with data from own experiments. 
 
Table A2. Aid distribution per round and per treatment (representative sharing treatment) 
a) Representatives 
Round Equal endowments Unequal endowments 
 Own share Excl. % Low % High % Own share Excl. % Low % High % 
6 0.46 (0.31) 16.1 42.9 41.1  0.45 (0.13) 7.1 60.7 32.1 
7 0.46 (0.30) 10.7 66.1 23.2  0.39 (0.19) 7.1 51.8 41.1 
8 0.47 (0.34) 1.8 41.1 57.1  0.48 (0.23) 3.6 58.9 37.5 
9 0.64 (0.30) 0.0 58.9 41.1  0.55 (0.24) 5.4 55.4 39.3 
10 0.41 (0.30) 1.8 48.2 50.0  0.50 (0.28) 14.3 37.5 48.2 
Total 0.49 (0.30) 6.1 51.4 42.5  0.48 (0.22) 7.5 52.9 39.6 
b) non-representatives 
Round Equal endowments Unequal endowments 
 Own share Excl. % Low % High % Own share Excl. % Low % High % 
6 0.52 (0.27) 13.0 42.3 44.8 0.51 (0.27) 8.9 38.0 53.2 
7 0.52 (0.25) 10.2 45.9 43.9 0.53 (0.26) 6.8 41.6 51.6 
8 0.47 (0.27) 6.8 40.6 52.6 0.52 (0.27) 9.4 38.6 52.1 
9 0.46 (0.27) 5.7 38.4 55.9 0.52 (0.27) 8.4 38.2 53.4 
10 0.50 (0.28) 8.4 35.9 55.7 0.55 (0.27) 9.1 32.3 58.6 
Total 0.49 (0.27) 8.8 40.6 50.6 0.53 (0.27) 8.5 37.7 53.8 
Source: Computations with data from own experiments. 
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Appendix 2: Experimental instructions and procedures 
(Translated from Spanish) 
[When people enter the meeting room, they are asked for their name. The candidates are 
registered on a list of invited candidates. They are given a sticker with an identification letter 
(ID), which we ask them to stick on their shirt. It is explained that this identity letter is unique 
and allows us to identify them during the exercise while guaranteeing complete 
confidentiality. This is important, as they are able to earn real money in the exercise. They 
are also given a small card with a number between 1 and 8, which we ask them to keep 
confidential. They are asked to take a seat in the meeting room. Further instructions are 
given once sufficient people have shown up.] 
 
‘You are invited to participate in an exercise, which allows you to earn real money. How 
much you earn depends on the decisions you will be asked to make, as well as the decisions 
of the other participants. If you pay sufficient attention to the instructions, you can, 
depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very 
important that you pay good attention.’ 
 
‘Participation is voluntary. Your decisions will be dealt with in a confidential way, i.e. 
nobody in the village will ever know your individual decisions, or the money you will have 
earned. The money you earn will be paid out to you privately and confidentially after the 
exercise. During the whole exercise, you are not allowed to communicate with the other 
participants. Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall 
have to exclude you from the exercise and from all payments.’ 
 
‘This exercise consists of several parts. All parts are completely unrelated. What you earn in 
one part will not influence your earnings in subsequent parts of this exercise. After this 
exercise we will ask you to fill in a short questionnaire. Thereafter, you will be paid out your 
earnings.’ 
Part 1: Equal endowments: basic treatment 
‘We now start with the first part of this exercise. The game in which you will participate now 
is different from the ones others have already played in this community; thus, the comments 
that you may have heard from others do not apply necessarily to this game.’ 
 
‘You have been selected to participate in a group of eight people among those that signed up 
for this exercise. On the card you received you see your participant number. This number will 
be the same during the whole exercise. On the whiteboard you also observe the player 
numbers. Each number represents one of you. No one will ever know which number 
corresponds to which participant in the room. You will be the only one who will know which 
of the number corresponds to you. You will never get to know the identity of the other 
persons. Nor will the other persons ever get to know your identity.’ 
 
[On the whiteboard each of the participants is represented with numbers 1—8. These are not 
the same as the identification letters (ID) that are given to the participants at the beginning of 
the experimental session. The combination of ID letters and participant numbers allows the 
experimenters to identify the participants during the exercise while guaranteeing complete 
confidentiality among the participants.] 
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‘In this part of the exercise we shall not speak of ‘córdobas’ but rather of ‘pesos’. Your entire 
earnings will be calculated in pesos. At the end of this exercise the total amount of Pesos you 
have earned will be converted to córdobas at the rate of 1 Córdoba = 10 Pesos.’ 
 
‘This exercise attempts to recreate a situation where a group of village members must make 
decisions about how to use their time to attract aid from external organizations. Imagine that 
an aid project arrives at the community, which asks the community to design a development 
project. For this, people need to invest time and energy to participate in meetings. The more 
people participate in these meetings and the more time they invest in this, the more 
development aid will be eventually attracted by the community.’ 
 
‘Each participant has 10 Pesos available. You have to decide how many of these 10 Pesos 
you want to dedicate to such meetings and how many to spend on your own economic 
activities. You can thus decide to either keep money for your private account, which will be 
paid out to you individually. Either you give money to the collective account.’ 
 
‘The total number of Pesos contributed to the group account is invested to attract a 
development project. The development programme will give aid money to the community up 
to an amount that is equal to the total amount in the collective account, increased with 60 per 
cent. This money will be equally distributed over all eight members.’ 
 
Thus, your income consists of the following two parts: 
 
1)  the Pesos you have kept for yourself (your private account) 
 
2)  your share of the ‘attracted aid money’. 
 
‘The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way. This 
means that each group member receives the same income from the aid project, irrespective of 
his contribution to the group account. Suppose the sum of the contributions of all group 
members is 40 Pesos. In this case, the total amount of aid is 64 Pesos, which is equally 
distributed among the eight participants, i.e. each receives 8 Pesos from the aid project.’ 
 
‘However, if no one contributes anything to the collective account no development aid is 
attracted, and each of you will have 10 Pesos. Alternatively, if each of you contribute 
everything to the collective account, the total amount of attracted aid would be 80 + 48(60 
per cent de 80) = 128 Pesos. This aid is divided equally among all group members, so that 
each would get 16 pesos. Finally, if all of you would contribute half of the 10 pesos (i.e. 5 
pesos), the total amount in the collective account would be 40 pesos, and the total aid would 
be 40 + 24 = 64 Pesos.’ 
  
 26
[Stick flipchart with table on the wall] 
 
Group 
member Contribution 
Private 
account Aid Income 
1. 5 5 8 = 13 
2. 0 10 8 = 18 
3. 6 4 8 = 12 
4. 5 5 8 = 13 
5. 10 0 8 = 8 
6. 7 3 8 = 11 
7. 3 7 8 = 15 
8. 4 6 8 = 14 
 
‘In the following example we will present the case where each group member contributes 
differently. In the table we observe that the total amount of contributions to the group account 
is equal to 40 Pesos, hence, the amount of attracted aid equals 64 Pesos, which leads to 8 
Pesos for each group member. Let’s now compare the earnings of each group member. Group 
member 2 who did not contribute anything to the collective account, obtained the highest 
earnings. Member 1 contributed 5 Pesos to the collective account and obtained 13 Pesos as 
final earnings. In contrast, group members who contributed all their endowment to the 
collective account (group member 5), i.e. 10 Pesos, obtained the lowest earnings. In sum, 
one’s earnings depend on the amount one contributes and the contributions of the other group 
members.’ 
 
[Distribute decision cards. Stick flipchart with decision card on the wall] 
 
‘We now explain how we are going to organize this exercise. To take a decision you will be 
given a decision card. On this decision card you will need to fill in the number of Pesetas you 
want to contribute to the group account, by filling in a number between 0 and 10. By deciding 
how many Pesos to contribute to the group account, you automatically also decide how many 
to keep for your private account, which is equal to the remainder of the 10 Pesos.’ 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
ID  
PLAYER NUMBER  
ROUND NUMBER  
CONTRIBUTION  
YOUR INCOME Pesos 
 
‘After all group members have made their decision we collect all decision cards. We then put 
your decisions on the whiteboard, which allows you to observe how much each of you has 
contributed. We will calculate the total number of Pesos contributed to the group account by 
all eight group members (including your contribution), and the amount of aid attracted. We 
also put the amount of aid each of you will receive. We then calculate your final income and 
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fill it in on your decision card. The decision cards will be returned to you privately so that 
you will get to know your final income.’ 
 
‘We will now play the previously described exercise several times.’ 
Unequal endowments—basic treatment 
 
The sentence ‘Each participant has 10 Pesos available” is replaced with “Four participants have 
12 Pesos available, while the other four participants have only 8 Pesos available.’ 
Equal endowments—representative distribution treatment 
‘In this second part of the exercise we ask you again to decide how much to contribute to the 
collective account. The amount of attracted aid is calculated in the same way as before. 
However, the attracted aid is now distributed by the group member who contributes most to 
the collective account. This implies that the attracted aid is not necessarily distributed 
equally. All other things remain the same.’ 
 
‘We now explain how we are going to organize this exercise. After each of you decided on 
the number of pesos to contribute to the group account, we will collect your decision cards. 
We will then put your decisions on the whiteboard, which allows you to observe how much 
each of you has contributed. We will calculate the total number of pesos contributed to the 
group account by all eight group members (including your contribution), and the amount of 
aid attracted.’ 
 
[Distribute ‘distribution’ decision cards. Stick flipchart with ‘distribution’ decision card on 
the wall] 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF AID 
ID  
PLAYER NUMBER  
ROUND NUMBER  
YOUR SHARE Pesos 
OTHERS’ SHARE 
 
O = NOTHING 
X = LOW 
XX = HIGH 
1. 2. 
3. 4. 
5. 6. 
7. 8. 
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‘After that, we will give you the second decision card, on which we ask you to distribute the 
money in the group account among the eight participants (yourself included). On the decision 
card, you observe the total amount of aid that arrives at your community. We ask you how 
you would like to distribute it among the group members. For this, we first ask you to decide 
on the amount of aid you want to keep for yourself. Thereafter, we ask you to distribute the 
remaining aid among the other seven group members. For this you choose between the 
following three options for each of these group members. You fill in “O” in the cell of a 
particular member if you do not want to give anything to that group member. You fill in “X” 
or “XX” if you want to give him a low or high share of the remaining aid, respectively. After 
collecting all decision cards, we will calculate your final earnings.’ 
 
‘Remember that only the distribution made by the participant who has contributed most, will 
in the end be implemented. In case two persons contribute most, we will let fate decide on 
who will become the representative. For this, we put all folded participant numbers that 
contributed most in a bag and let someone select one.’ 
 
[All group members will be asked to fill in a distribution decision card in order to guarantee 
anonymity of the community representative.] 
 
‘Thereafter, we collect these decision cards as well. After calculating the earnings of each 
group member (endowment kept in private account + received aid) these are presented on the 
whiteboard and filled in on the first decision cards, which are returned to respective players. 
We will now play the previously described exercise several times.’ 
Unequal endowments—representative distribution treatment 
We replace in the instructions of part 2 the phrase ‘Each participant has 10 pesos available’ 
with ‘Four participants have 12 pesos available, whereas the other four participants have only 
8 pesos available.’ 
 
We will play the previously described exercise several times. 
Final instructions 
Finally, to get ready to play the game, please let us know if you have difficulties reading or 
writing numbers and one of the monitors will seat next to you and assist you with these. Also, 
please keep in mind that from now on no conversation or statements should be made by you 
during the game. 
 
[We assure that there is sufficient space between each participant to guarantee privacy and 
to prevent copying. Once everybody is seated again, we start with the first round of the 
experiment.] 
